The development of corporate governance in China / Z. Jun Lin, Ming Liu, Xu Zhang by Lin, Z. Jun & Ming, Liu
ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING JOURNAL
CHIEF EDITORS
©  Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal is jointly published by APMAA and Faculty of
Accountancy, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), 40450 Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia.
The views and opinions expressed therein are those of the individual authors, and the publication of
these statements in the ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING JOURNAL do not imply
endorsement by the publishers or the editorial staff. Copyright is vested jointly in UiTM and APMAA.
Written permission is required to reproduce any part of this publication.
Assoc Prof Dr Rozainun Abdul Aziz, Universiti
Teknologi   MARA, Malaysia
Prof Ibrahim Kamal Abdul Rahman, Universiti
Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
Prof Ralph Adler, University of Otago, New
Zealand
Prof Taesik Ahn, Seoul National University,
Korea
Prof Takayuki Asada, Osaka University, Japan
Prof John Burns, University of Dundee,
Scotland, UK
Prof Chan Yoke Kai, University of New South
Wales Asia, Singapore
Dr Chris Chapman, University Reader in
Accounting, Oxford Said Business School,
Oxford, UK
Prof Yuanlue Fu, Xiamen University, China
Prof Amy H.Lau, University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong
Prof Lin Zhijun, Hong Kong Baptist University,
Hong Kong
Prof Sakthi Mahenthiran, Butler University,
USA
Prof Falconer Mitchell, University of
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
Prof Yasuhiro Monden, Mejiro University,
Japan
Prof Johei Oshita, Kyushu University, Japan
Assoc Prof Dr Sujatha Perera, Macquarie
University, Australia
Prof Supapun Ruttanaporn, University of
Chulalongkorn, Thailand
Prof Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, University of
Washington, USA
Prof Maliah Sulaiman, International Islamic
University, Malaysia
Prof Dennis Taylor, University of  South
Australia, Australia
Prof Yang Tzong Tsay, National Taiwan
University, Taiwan
Prof Susumo Ueno, Konan University, Japan
Prof Akira Nishimura
Beppu University, Japan
Prof Roger Willett
University of Wollonggong, Dubai
MANAGING  EDITORS
Prof Normah Omar
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
Assoc Prof Dr Suzana Sulaiman
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
JOURNAL  ADMINISTRATOR
Assoc Prof Dr Wee Shu Hui
Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
EDITORIAL ADVISORY AND REVIEW BOARD
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
Z. Jun Lin
 Ming Liu
 Xu Zhang
Department of Accountancy & Law
Hong Kong Baptist University
Hong Kong
Abstract
This paper delineates the development of corporate governance in China in the course of
the recent market-oriented economic reforms. The four-stage evolutionary progresses of
corporate governance practices in the country are outlined, while the main deficiencies in
the existing governance practices of the Chinese companies are analyzed. In addition, the
most recent efforts made by the Chinese government in order to promote capital market
reforms and improve corporate governance practices are described. It is argued that a
series of corporate governance practices originating in western countries have been
gradually adopted or experimented in China although the actual effects of their
implementation in practice remains to be seen.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Chinese economic reforms, enterprise reform, Chinese
corporations
Introduction
The importance of corporate governance derives from the separation of ownership
and management in large organization. There is a need to establish appropriate
control and monitoring procedures to ensure management can effectively utilize
the entrusted resources to add values for business owners (Karpoff et al. 1996;
Bhagat and Black 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). The owners (investors) do not
directly participate in the daily operations as management is involved in the planning
and control of business activities. Owing to divergence in the interests of owners
and managers, management may pursue self-welfare at the expense of owners.
Conflict of interest causes agency costs to be borne by different parties. In order
to minimize agency costs, a set of control mechanisms or procedures is set up to
bind the behaviors of owners (principal) and management (agent). These
mechanisms are an important part of good corporate governance (Eisenhardt
1989; Bushman and Smith 2001).
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Since business firms have many stakeholders there are varied kinds of principal-
agent relations, e.g., between owners and management, controlling (large)
shareholders and minority shareholders, creditors and owners, regulatory bodies
and business firms, etc. A primary objective of corporate governance (CG) is
thus to monitor the behaviors of different interested parties and to reduce the
agency costs associated with these varied principal-agent relations (Karpoff et
al. 1996; Lashgari 2004; Marnet 2005). Thus corporate governance can be defined
as “a set of mechanisms, both industrial and market-based, that induce the self-
interested controllers of a company to make decisions that maximize the value of
the company to its owners” (Denis and McConnell 2003). More specifically
speaking, corporate governance is the set of institutional mechanisms that maintain
an appropriate balance between the rights of shareholders and the needs of the
board of directors (BoD) and management to direct and manage a firm’s affairs
(TIAA-CREF 2004).
Many studies have demonstrated that corporate governance is positively associated
with the efficiency and effectiveness of business operations and capital market
performance (Morck et al. 1988; La Porta et al. 2002; Joh 2003). People generally
believe that good corporate governance increases a firm’s market valuation.
McKinsey conducted a series of surveys with institutional investors and private
equity investors in the context of emerging markets and reported that 80% of
these investors were willing to pay a premium to well governed firms (McKinsey
& Company, 1999-2002). In addition, Black (2001) and Joh (2003) both found a
positive correlation between performance measures and levels of governance.
Sound corporate governance increases a firm’s value and attracts the trust and
investment of capital market participants (Gompers et al. 2003; Steen 2005; Pagano
and Volpin 2005). Consequently, more and more institutions, researchers and
practitioners in both developed and developing countries are devoting more attention
to corporate governance principles and have proposed various approaches to
raise the standards of corporate governance (Denis and McConnell 2003; Bai et
al. 2004; Ugeux 2004; Jirapornet et al. 2005).
Due to significant differences in social, economic, legal and cultural systems
from those in developed western countries, where the modern corporation evolved,
business systems and governance practices in China have distinct characteristics.
Although the differences between Chinese and Western economies have lessened
in recent years, corporate governance practices in China remain relatively
unsophisticated. This paper illustrates the evolution of these practices at the present
time.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five further sections. Four stages in the
development of corporate governance in Chinese businesses is introduced in the
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next section, followed by an analysis of the major deficiencies or problems inherent
in the governance practices in Chinese companies. The next section illustrates
the most recent corporate governance reforms implemented by the Chinese
government. Finally a brief section ends the paper.
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China
Following the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese government
adopted the public (state) ownership of all production means and the formal-
Soviet-style planned economy. All enterprises were considered as being owned
by the people and the state (through government authorities at different levels)
directly ran enterprises with centralized planning and control. Business enterprises
were treated as the basic producing units for implementing national economic
plans. Business managers were directly appointed by government authorities in
charge at different levels. Under the Socialist doctrine, production workers were
regarded as owners of the means of productions having the same interests as the
state, although business managers and workers did not directly share the ownership
rights and benefits.
Under the centralized system, all capital was provided by the state. Businesses
had little economic independence and management had almost no decision-making
rights in terms of production or operations. Profits earned by the enterprises
belonged to the state’s public finance department. There were no commodity
capital and capital markets and business operations were not subject to market
pressures, so long as enterprises fulfilled the production and sales plans laid down
by government. Obviously, Chinese such state businesses were not run like modern
enterprises during this period. As a result the governance mechanisms in the
state-run businesses were substituted by hierarchic and bureaucratic
administrations. Under highly centralized governmental controls, the importance
of corporate governance was ignored before the 1980s.
State ownership and the planned economy over more than 30 years was perceived
as resulting in production inefficiencies and economic stagnation in China, forcing
the Chinese government to introduce market-oriented economic reforms in the
late 1970s. After more than two decades of economic reforms, significant changes
were effected in Chinese economy. In particular, the original state-owned and
state-run businesses have been restructured to become relatively independent
business entities operating under an emerging market-oriented economic system.
Thus corporate governance has gradually become an important issue for enterprise
reform in China, and corporate governance practices have evolved gradually
through four major development stages.
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Initial Development (from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s)
A primary objective of the early economic reforms was to gradually adjust the
relations between the state and the state-run businesses, aiming to increasing the
autonomy of businesses and expanding the decision-making power of business
managers. Confined, however, by orthodox Socialism doctrines, the government
did not want to give up public (state) ownership and planned economic
administration. All businesses remained state-owned and run by government
authorities at various levels. However, certain reform measures on business
governance were introduced in order to motivate business managers to raise
production efficiency. For instance, the state, through various government
departments, relaxed, to a certain extent, the centralized control of businesses
and reduced direct intervention in business production and operations.
Businesses were required to be relatively independent operating entities with
certain autonomy. Business managers were allowed to make some operating
decisions in the light of their operating conditions. The government implemented
a policy of ‘taxes instead of profit’ to invigorate enterprises, i.e., introducing
income taxes to replace the formal practice of remitting all profits to the state,
while businesses were allowed to retain a certain amount of after-tax profits for
business expansion and employees’ benefits (including bonuses to managers and
workers).
Such reform measures changed the relation between the state, as owners, and
businesses. They also induced business managers to exercise greater power in
decision-making. As a result, the importance of effective corporate governance
began to be recognized and some efforts to set up governance mechanisms were
made to constrain managers’ behaviors, to reduce the potential agency costs. For
instance, all businesses were required to establish a managing committee consisting
of party workers and employee representatives, to assist and monitor business
managers (factory directors) in making decisions on importance issues.
Nonetheless, as businesses remained directly owned and controlled by the state,
and emerging commodity markets were relatively insignificant, the mechanisms
of corporate governance similar to those found in modern western market
economies could not function well in China during this period Gelb et al. 1993;
Groves et al. 1994; Li 1997)
Contracted Responsibility and the Business Leasing System (in the
mid 1980s)
Since the mid 1980s, Chinese economic reforms have been aimed raising the
operating efficiency and effectiveness of business entities. The government
introduced the ‘Contracted responsibility system’ or the leasing of SOEs, e.g.,
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allowing business management and workers to lease the SOEs from the
government. This allowed SOEs to have relatively independent operations, as
long as they succeeded in paying the authorities in charge of the agreed-upon
amount of profits and taxes (the contracted responsibilities).
The rationale behind the contracted responsibility system was to maintain state-
ownership while providing individuals economic incentives. Under the contracted
responsibility system, state-ownership was reflected by the collection of profits
or taxes. Business managers (the leasees) were, in return, given discretion in
running businesses and residual rewards from the business after the deduction of
the agreed “rental” and taxes, payable to the government. The system was designed
to encourage business managers to make greater efforts to increase business
productivity and effectiveness. However, the system created significant agency
costs, as business managers pursued short-term behaviors such as income
manipulation.  For example managers might seek exorbitant personal returns by
maximizing current period income at the expense of future development of
businesses, infringing upon the state’s (and the people’s) long-term interests.
Instances of dysfunctional behaviour resulting from the business leasing system
included managers running down the production facilities by deferring necessary
maintenance expenditures or R & D spending in current period, and manipulating
income to maximize payouts. The ability to control disclosure by management
made it hard to monitor behaviour, as managers tended to be left alone so long as
they could pay their rentals and taxes.  As a result of a lack of governance
mechanism whose effective procedures the state could not find, the contracted
responsibility/business leasing system was not successful and officially abandoned
by the government in the late 1980s (Xu 2000).
Business Restructuring with Incorporation in the 1990s
As the pace of economic reform accelerated, the problems of SOEs governance
were exacerbated. The effect of a system in which the state acted as the owner,
administrator and regulator of business, was that any number of government
authorities could, and frequently did, intervene in the operations of SOEs.  This
led to poor operating results.  In addition, the management of SOEs was delegated
to appointees of government authorities who were often judged in terms of their
political, rather than economic, performance. Business managers did not bear the
risks or losses of businesses though they might perform poorly. Under such kind
of governance structures, conflicts of interest between the state and enterprises,
or between government officials and business managers, were inevitable.
According to the government’s statistics, at the beginning of 1990s, more than
two-third of SOEs made losses (Qian 1996; Lin 2001).
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In order to solve this problem, the Chinese government launched a business
restructuring movement in the early 1990s, by incorporating the original SOEs,
i.e., forming limited liability companies in order to make SOEs independent
enterprises. Also, the government introduced another reform to separate the
governmental and business administration functions by setting up the State
Administration of State-Owned Assets (SASA) and industrialized administrative
companies of state-owned assets in the mid 1990s. It was anticipated that the
SASA and industrialized holding companies would better represent the state’s
interests, as the owner of SOEs. Thereafter, state and other governmental
authorities would no longer participate in business operations, while the newly
incorporated enterprises were required to increase value for their owners. The
Chinese government reopened two share markets in Shanghai (SHSE) and
Shenzhen (SZSE) in 1990 and 1991, respectively, to facilitate the conversion of
SOEs into share-capital based companies (Sun and Wilson 2003). In addition, the
government enacted and implemented the first Company Law in China in 1993
to provide legal support for the incorporation process.
With the establishment of limited liability companies, there was a substantial change
in the ownerships structure of business enterprises. There was a clearer separation
of ownership and management, with demands for a large number of professional
managers to take up additional administration functions. Corporate governance
became a more evident critical issue and it was necessary to establish a set of
corporate governance mechanisms compatible with the new incorporated
enterprises.
The Chinese government drew on the experience of corporations in the western
countries since the mid 1990s. For instance, the Company Law states that a
company must set up three-tier corporate governing bodies with a balance
between the powers of shareholders, Boards of Directors (BoD) and other levels
of management. Shareholders appoint BoD members to direct and monitor more
junior management and business operations, while the appointment, evaluation
and dismissal of management officers is conducted by the BoD on behalf of
shareholders. The Company Law also requires Chinese companies to set up a
Supervisory Board (SB) with membership drawn from representatives of the
SASA, relevant government authorities and well as internal employees. Although
a SB does not participate in a company’s operational decision making, it exercises
supervision over the work of the BoD, the performance of management and the
business’ financial affairs (Shi and Weisert 2002).  Such a German-styled, multi-
tier Board system has become the backbone of corporate governance in most
Chinese companies since the mid 1990s.
The Chinese government further promoted the public listing of share-capital
companies and the development of capital market in the 1990s. A large number
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of SOEs went public after converting the original SOEs into companies to be
listed, both in China and abroad. By the end of 2001, about 1200 companies were
listed in the SHSE and SESE while more than 100 Chinese companies were listed
in Hong Kong (H-share), New York, London and other overseas capital markets
(Sun and Wilson 2003; Bai et al. 2004).
As a result of the reforms of the 1990s, stakeholders in listed companies are
more than just the state and business management, and include many other public
investors, both institutional and individual. There are different contractual relations
among the various interested parties and management is more complicated than
in the era of state-owned companies. It is now quite natural to demand corporate
governance structures with higher standards. The Chinese market regulators, the
China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) in particular, have set out more
detailed regulations on the accountability, transparency and information disclosure
required of listed companies. In particular, listed companies are required to publish
financial statements regularly and on a timely basis and they must be audited by
authorized Chinese CPAs in order to ensure their quality.
Standardization of Corporate Governance Practices (since 2000)
Following the exposures of several corporate scandals in the western countries,
including Enron, WorldCom, and Xerox in the early 2000s, governments, market
regulators, and public investors in many countries have paid increasing attention
to corporate governance and efforts have been made to improve the standards of
good corporate governance practices (Shi and Weisert 2002; Ugeux 2004; Steen
2005; Pagano and Volpin 2005). During the same period, corporate scandals
were also uncovered in the Chinese stock market. Fraud has resulted in substantial
losses to Chinese investors, reducing the confidence of investors and causing a
significant outflow of capital from share markets and a consequent reduction in
value. This prompted the Chinese government to place more emphasize on market
reform and strengthen the governance practices of listed companies. New rules
or practices were introduced since the early 2000s, aimed at standardizing and
improving corporate governance practices for Chinese companies. The major
changes include:
Introduction of an Independent Directors’ System
Almost all Chinese companies have set up SBs in accordance with the requirement
of the Company Law, but the prescribed SB functions of exercising supervision
over the performance BoDs and management does not work well in practice. In
consequence, the CSRC has introduced the Anglo-Saxon style indirect
(nonexecutive) director system to Chinese listed companies, in order to strengthen
the monitoring role of BoD on management performance and business operations.
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Under a “Guideline on the establishing Independent Director System in the
Listed Companies” issued in August 2001, all listed companies are required to
appoint independent directors, with these being at least one-third of the BoD
membership by June 30, 2003. Independent directors are authorized to review
and express independent opinions on significant related-party transactions, the
nomination of directors and the appointment and dismissal of senior management
officers, before these matters are submitted to BoD for discussion. Independent
directors also review the determination of compensation or remuneration of
directors and senior management officers (CSRC 2001). According to a recent
study almost all Chinese listed companies have appointed independent directors
to conform to CSRC requirements (Lin 2005).
Adoption of Best Corporate Governance Practices
The CSRC issued “Standards on Corporate Governance for the Publicly
Listed Companies” in 2002, which was prepared with reference to the codes of
best corporate governance practices in the UK and US.  The new Standards lay
down a series of requirements on the right of shareholders, procedures at
shareholders’ meetings, related party-transactions, the behaviour of controlling
shareholders, the independence, nomination and appointment of directors,
obligations of directors, composition and responsibilities of the BoD, procedures
of BoD meetings, the independent director system, composition, working
procedures and responsibilities of the SB, performance assessment for directors,
SB members, and senior management officers, the appointment of, and incentive
for senior management officers, transparency and information disclosure, and so
on. At present the Standards have been adopted by most listed companies.
Some of the recommended corporate governance practices include (CSRC 2002):
a. A listed company must be independent of its parent companies or controlling
shareholders with respect to manpower, financing and resources;
b. The position of chairman of the BoD and the CEO of a listed company may
not be taken by senior officers of parent companies;
c. Special arrangements must be made if one person is to hold both the position
of Board chairman (president) and CEO, or the positions must be occupied
by different people;
d. Related party-transactions must follow the arm’s length principle – the
transactions should be based on relevant market prices and should be reviewed
and endorsed by independent directors, while BoD members should not vote
on matters concerning transactions with which they are related;
e. Listed companies are not allowed to undertake loan guarantees for their
controlling parents and other related parties;
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f. The nomination of directors must be reviewed and endorsed by independent
directors and appointed by a voting system in the annual general meeting
(AGM);
g. A strategic development committee, nomination and remuneration committee,
and audit committee should be set up under the BoD with independent directors
serving either as the majority of the members or as the convener of those
special committees, and at least one member of the audit committee should
be an independent director who is an ‘accounting expert; and,
h. Listed companies should publicly disclose information about the corporate
governance procedures and performance.
Improvement of the Quality of Information Disclosure
Chinese market regulators now stress the importance of corporate transparency
and the quality of information disclosure by the listed companies. Since 2001, the
CSRC and the two stock exchanges have issued regulations on the content and
quality of the annual financial reports and other disclosures to be released by
listed companies (Lin 2005). Under these regulations, the Chairperson and CFO
(or director of the accounting department) are required to certify the truthfulness
and completeness of the financial data disclosed to the market. All listed companies
must release their audited annual financial statements within 4 months after the
fiscal year end, in order to ensure timeliness of the financial reports. For significant
transactions or events that may have an impact on the movement of stock prices,
reports should be submitted to the CSRS and the stock exchanges, and otherwise
publicly disclosed, within five working days. Following the implementation of
Standards on Corporate Governance in 2002, listed companies are now required
to annually disclose information about existing procedures of corporate governance,
such as the composition or membership of the BoD and SB, the working status
and performance assessment of the BoD and SB, the performance of independent
directors, the composition and work of the special committees under the BoD,
and the plans or procedures that will be adopted to improve corporate governance
practices, etc.
In order to ensure the quality of information disclosure, the CSRC and other
regulatory authorities have also enacted a regulations to strengthen supervision
and policing over the behavior of professional market intermediaries such as
securities and futures dealing companies, law firms, CPA firms and property
assessors or asset appraisal firms. Investigations and penalties (e.g., fines,
suspension of practicing licenses or revocation of professional certificates) against
rule-violations have been increased. In general, there has been a considerable
improvement in the quantity and quality of information disclosures by Chinese
listed companies in recent years.
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Major Deficiencies of Corporate Governance in China
Despite the reforms described in the last section, there are some weaknesses in
corporate governance practices in Chinese companies, owing to the constraints
of the former centralized business administrative system and imperfections in the
capital markets of China. Major deficiencies inherent in the corporate governance
practices in Chinese companies include the following:
Absence of a “Real” Owner and Heavy Agency Costs
Although a large number of SOEs have been incorporated, the state remains the
major owner or shareholder of Chinese companies. Even though the government
has set up SASA and some industrialized holding companies of state-owned
properties to exercise de facto ownership rights over the state’s equity shares in
the incorporated entities, the officials in SASA and other industrialized holding
companies are essentially the second-order agents instead of real owners of the
state interest in business enterprises. They do not take responsibility for the results
of business operations, including the losses these may incur. In fact, officials in
government authorities may pursue their own welfare (such as job promotions or
increases in salaries and other benefits) at the expense of the interests of the
state. “Owner absence” inevitably leads to two-tier, principal-agent relations in
Chinese companies: one between the state (as principals) and the officials of
SASA and other industrialized holding companies of state-owned properties (as
agents); and another between the government officials (as principals) in charge
and business management (as agents). These dual principal-agent relations have
quite often resulted in significant agency costs (including moral hazard problems)
due to the absence of a real, identifiable owner of state-owned properties. In
particular, with bureaucracy and corruption, government officials have frequently
surrendered the supervision rights of ownership over business operations in
exchange for perquisites from business management (Xu et al. 2005).
Monopolist Controlling Shareholding and ‘Tunneling Behaviors’
Research has found that majority shareholders may try to maximize self-interest
through ‘tunneling’ or benefit transfers, expropriating the interests of other minority
shareholders and related parties (La Porta et al. 1999, 2002; Johnson et al. 2000).
Such “tunneling behavior” is extreme in China due to the unique equity structure
of Chinese listed companies. At present there are three sources of equity capital
for most listed companies in China: state-shares, representing the state’s interest
in a listed company, legal-entity shares, being the equity held by other SOEs or
social units and public shares, held by both institutional and individual investors.
State shares account for a significantly large proportion of the total equity. Under
the current ‘split-share system,’ only public shares are tradable in the market.
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State-shares and legal entity-shares are not tradable at present, so there is little
motivation for controlling large shareholders to care about changes in the share
price of listed companies.  Controlling shareholders have frequently intervened in
the operations of the listed firms to benefit parent companies, using the listed
firms to guarantee loans for related entities, and exposing the listed firms to
unnecessary financial and operating risks. In fact, the controlling shareholders of
many listed companies, who are mainly government agencies or parent SOEs,
are often motivated only to raise funds in the stock market. Benefit transfers
through the misappropriation of funds or related-party transactions infringe upon
the interests of shareholders and public investors. Controlling shareholders have
a monopolist’s position so they can control or dominate the nomination and
appointment of directors and senior management, excluding other shareholders
from participation in making operating decisions. The monopolist position of
controlling large shareholders not only facilitates tunneling behavior but also frees
listed companies and senior management from the supervision of minority
shareholders and other interested parties.
Dysfunction of Internal Supervision Mechanisms
Although Chinese companies have set up SBs in order to monitor the performance
of BoDs, management and business financial affairs under the requirements of
the Company Law, SBs are more “decorative” than functional in reality. This is
mainly due to the fact that the composition of an SB is subject to the dominant
influences of controlling shareholders (e.g., government agencies or the parent
SOEs). Currently, most SB members are the representatives of controlling
shareholders (e.g., government officials in SASA and the industrialized holding
companies of the state-owned properties), party committees and employees’
unions. Many SB members are insiders and they share direct or indirect interests
with large shareholders or senior management. Furthermore, most SB members
lack knowledge and expertise in law, accounting and business administration, and
they can hardly exercise effective supervision or monitoring (Xiao et al. 2004).
Although the CSRC introduced the independent director system in order to
strengthen the BoD’s supervision over management performance and business
financial affairs, the system does not function well at present. Although most
Chinese listed companies have now appointed at least one-third of their directors
to BoD as “independent”, most are academics or social celebrities who have little
experience in actual business operations and management processes.
Many independent directors are willing to spend little time and effort in investigating
business operations and monitoring management performance, owing to a fairly
low level of compensation. Most are nominated by senior management and are
reluctant to be adversarial, risking loss of reappointment and remuneration.
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Therefore, most independent directors cannot exercise effective monitoring over
management performance and business financial affairs. It is unsurprising that
many companies have treated independent directors as mere “flower vases” to
lift the image of corporate governance, while the effectiveness of their supervisory
role is doubtful.
Coexistence of SB and independent director system may have further obstructed
the internal supervision mechanisms in Chinese companies because of overlap
in the prescribed functions or roles of SB and independent directors. The dual-
supervision system results in not only a turf war or tension between SB members
and independent directors, but also the resistance from management to the
duplicated or redundant supervision functions. In fact the potential conflicts of
interest between SB members and independent directors often cause
ineffectiveness or failure in the internal supervision mechanism. Although the
motivation behind the dual-supervision mechanism is admirable, the actual
operation of mixing up the two-board (Continental-law system) and unit-board
(Common-law system) in corporate governance structure may not necessarily
be desirable.
Weak Enforcement of Market Regulations
Market regulation and surveillance system remain under-developed in China.
There is a severe shortage in both market regulation and enforcement manpower.
The enforcement of many business laws and regulations is far from satisfactory
and the “soft-binding” phenomenon prevails in China. Therefore, many regulation
violations are not investigated and disciplined. The regulatory authorities’
surveillance or monitoring of serious misstatements and the manipulation of stock
prices is less than satisfactory at present. Fraudulent reports and misleading
information disclosures are not uncommon and insider trading is frequent in the
market. Weak regulation and serious corporate misconduct has brought about
losses to investors and hampered market confidence. A relatively weak regulatory
surveillance system has led to wide spread rules violations and corporate scandals.
Corporate governance depends upon enforcement as well as legislation. Corporate
governance practices will remain substandard in an environment with a weak
market regulation system (Lashgari 2004).
New Efforts Toward Corporate Governance Reform
The Chinese government has recognized the existence of problems in corporate
governance and is introducing more reform measures. The main reforms of the
most recent period are as follows:
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Promoting the Sustainable Development of Capital Markets
The State Council issued “Opinions on Promoting Capital Market Reforms
and Sustainable Growth” in January 2004, in order to provide an authoritative
guideline for the consolidation and development of capital markets in China. The
Opinions addressed several key policy issues on how to enhance the quality of
listed company governance and to standardize operations in capital market.
Particularly, it stresses that all listed companies should establish ‘modern enterprise
systems’ to achieve a balanced power structure among executive and supervisory
units, enhance the accountability of directors and senior management officers,
further regulate the behavior of controlling shareholders and enhance the effective
functioning of the independent director system.
Thus, controlling shareholders can be held liable for misconduct that encroaches
upon the interests of listed companies, minority shareholders and other interested
parties. The Opinions states that emphasis should be placed upon the obligations
of individuals who are responsible for financial reports and other information
disclosures, to ensure the truthfulness, accuracy, completeness and timeliness of
disclosed information. Mandatory suspension of the rights and privileges to issue
new securities or delist stocks will be imposed on those listed companies that do
not disclose information in compliance with the required procedures. In addition,
listed companies are allowed to establish incentive schemes for senior management.
Accordingly, the CSRC has issued new rules on how to improve corporate
governance in listed companies, such as standardized procedures for dealing with
the relations among investors (shareholders), the BoD, and business management;
the implementation of qualification procedure and training of independent directors,
the regular assessment of the work of independent directors; and establishment
of stock options or other incentive schemes to motivate management to improve
corporate governance and business operating effectiveness.
Protecting the Interests of  Public Investors
In light of the State Council’s Opinions, the CSRC introduced “Rules on
Protection of the Legitimate Rights and Interest of the Holders of Publicly-
tradable Shares” in late 2004. The new Rules imposed several specific measures
in order to curb tunneling behavior.
For instance, a voting system involving minority holders of publicly tradable shares
is required. Significant business transactions, such as issuing new securities, assets
swaps with significant amounts (over 20% of total audited book values) or business
restructuring, debt repayments, the conversion of securities and overseas listing
of subsidiaries, must gain the prior approval of public investors holding more than
half of the total tradable shares, before being tabled to the AGM of shareholders.
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Listed companies must establish and maintain good investor relations. For example,
a listed company should establish a sound working system of investor relations
and the company secretary should be responsible for maintaining a good relationship
with investors. Various means of communications with investors, such as setting
up consulting “hotlines”, website assess and regular press briefings, etc. are required
for listed companies to provide timely feedback to inquiries from public investors.
The Rules also encourage listed companies to distribute profits and adopt positive
dividend policies to prevent tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders through
related-party transactions and or profit transfers through transfer pricing. Thus
profit distribution and dividend policy must be addressed explicitly in corporate
charters. The BoD must issue an explanatory note if no profit distribution or cash
dividend payout is to be made in the period, while decisions to not distribute profit
must also be assessed by independent directors. Furthermore, listed companies
are not allowed to issue new shares or convertible securities to the public if no
profit distribution or cash dividend has been made in the most recent three years
(Lin 2005).
Strengthening Supervision Over Controlling Shareholders and Senior
Management
The CSRC issued further new rules in 2004 and 2005 in order to prevent majority
shareholders from encroaching upon the interests of listed companies and other
shareholders. If controlling shareholders or parent companies, for instance, engage
in tunneling funds from a listed company, refunds or repayment of the funds must
be made, firstly using the cash dividends to which they are entitled. The CSRC
further requires that the listed companies should not provide loan guarantees for
controlling shareholders or other related parties, and illegitimate loan guarantees
must be rescinded by the end of 2006. The CSRC will not accept applications for
new share issues or other security sales from companies being investigated for
misuse of funds.
The CSRC and the two stock exchanges have also strengthened their monitoring
of the behavior of senior management officers. The names of those senior
management officers who have committed dishonest acts will be kept in ‘black-
books’ by market regulatory authorities and the stock exchanges, and disclosed
to the public. Those directors and senior management officers who have committed
serious rule-violations will be banned from the market and be made legally liable
for losses suffered by listed companies and public shareholders. Any person who
has been debarred by market regulatory authorities for less than 2 years is not
allowed to be reappointed to a senior management position. Implementation of
these new rules should help to enhance the honesty and accountability of directors,
supervisors and senior management officers and promote good corporate
governance in Chinese companies.
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‘All-Circulation’ Reform
A root cause of most corporate governance problems in Chinese companies is
derived from the split-share system, which divides shares into non-tradable state-
shares and legal entity shares and tradable public shares. Non-circulation of the
dominant portion of the state-owned shares induces dysfunctional behavior among
controlling shareholders that encroaches upon the interests of other shareholders.
To solve this problem, the Chinese government introduced the so-called ‘all-
circulation’ reform in late 2005 aimed at speeding up the development of capital
markets and improving corporate governance.
A main task of the most recently introduced reforms is to allow trading of formerly
not-tradable shares, with certain conditions. The circulation of shares exposes
controlling shareholders to market discipline. Since only public investors holding
tradable shares bore risks before the ‘all-circulation’ reforms, the holders of
formerly not-tradable shares (i.e., the state-shares and legal-entity shares) are
required to compensate public shareholders in consideration for allowing the
circulation of non-tradable shares in the market. Therefore, bargaining to reach
parity between the two sides is required to set the conditions for an ‘all circulation’
market, which could involve issuing new shares to public shareholders at discounts
or paying premiums for shares held by public investors.  Implementation of the
‘all-circulation’ reforms will have a significant impact on the relationships between
the various interested parties of a listed company and all shareholders will share
risks on an equal basis.
Concluding Remarks
Corporate governance practices have evolved at a relatively slow pace in China.
Under the former public ownership, centralized planning economy, all businesses
were state-owned and state-run after the communist party took power in 1949.
The mechanisms of corporate governance derived from free market economies
were absent until the Chinese government launched economic reforms in the
early 1980s. In line with market-oriented economic reforms, the government
restructured ailing SOEs and abandoned the state-run business administration
system by separating the ownership and management of businesses. By these
changes, enterprises were required to be relatively independent business entities,
exposed to market pressures. Later, in the 1990s, many SOEs were incorporated
to become limited-liability companies or publicly listed companies. As a result, the
Chinese government started to pay attention to the issues of corporate governance,
in order to balance the divergent interests of various parties and enhance the
operating efficiency and effectiveness of Chinese companies.
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Significant progresses in corporate governance can be witnessed in China in the
last two decades. Abreast of the development of market-oriented economy, the
modern enterprise system is taking shape. Thus many corporate governance
practices stemming from Western countries have been introduced, including the
separation of ownership and management; the establishment of shareholders’
meetings, Boards of Directors and supervisory boards for directing and monitoring
managerial performance; restrictions on related-party transactions; minority
shareholder protection; better corporate transparency, increasing the quality and
timeliness of corporate reports and information disclosure; a strengthening of
market regulation and surveillance, standardization of market intermediary services
and improvements in investor relations; and the ‘all-circulation’ reforms. The
effect of the implementation and enforcement of the new regulations or measures
remains to be observed in practice.  However, despite some remaining deficiencies,
the changes can only positively contribute to the advancement of corporate
governance practices in China, in terms of prevailing international standards or
norms, and they should lift investor confidence and promote the productivity and
effectiveness of Chinese companies.
One of the critical problems in corporate governance practices in China is the
‘absence of owner’ which resulted from the years of state control of the means
of production and produced significant agency costs. Although many SOEs have
now been incorporated through business restructuring, the state remains the main
owner of Chinese companies. Even though ownership rights have been delegated
to SASA and industrialized holding companies of state-owned properties,
government officials are unlikely to be held ultimately responsible the survival of
business enterprises. As such, as representatives of state-owned properties, they
will continue to exercise the rights of resource allocation and control without
bearing the risks associated with property rights. Thus the incentive remains for
them to pursue their self-interests by encroaching upon the interests of the
enterprise and other related parties. Although there has been a significant change
in the corporate governance structure of Chinese companies, the potential conflicts
of interest among various parties stemming from the problem of ‘absence of
owner’ have yet to be completely resolved. This may hamper the future
development of corporate governance in China.
The evolution of corporate governance practices depends upon the development
of the Chinese economy. Following the growth of a market-oriented economy,
the modern, western-style enterprise system has become increasingly important
in the Chinese economy emphasizing the need for good corporate governance.
Although the advance of corporate governance has been slow, the government
continues to push capital market reform and enterprise restructuring and to adopt
the best governance experience from western countries. It should also be noticed
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that there are substantial differences in the economic, social, legal and cultural
systems in China and the West. A simple transplant of western corporate
governance practices to Chinese companies may not work. Adaptation or
innovation of corporate governance, contextual to Chinese business environment
is necessary. Further improvement of corporate governance practices will rely
upon a sound market regulatory and monitoring environment in China. Much
could be still done to strengthen the legal system and the extent of market
surveillance over the performance of the senior management in large corporations,
in order to reach better corporate governance standards.
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